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WITNESS COACHING BY PROSECUTORS 
Bennett L. Gershman* 
Witness coaching has been described as the ''dark"l-some 
have even called it "dirtyV+ecret of the U.S. adversary system." 
It is a practice, some claim, that more than anything else has given 
trial lawyers a reputation as purveyors of  falsehood^.^ Witnesses 
are prepared by lawyers in private, no records are kept, and the 
participants do not openly discuss the en~ounter.~ If false or 
* Professor of Law, Pace Law School; New York University School of Law, J.D.; 
Princeton University, B.A. The author wishes to thank Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky and 
the Cardozo Law Review for inviting him to participate in the Cooperating Witnesses 
Symposium. The author also wishes to thank Professors Lissa Griffin, Steve Goldberg, 
David Dorfman, and John Humbach for their helpful comments. 
John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEx. L. REV. 277,279 (1989) ("Witness 
preparation is treated as one of the dark secrets of the legal profession."). 
Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of 
Impropriety Standard to Proseciltors, 63 Mo. L. REV. 699, 740 (1998) (describing witness 
preparation as "The Profession's Dirty Little Secret"). 
See State v. Earp, 571 A.2d 1227, 1235 (Md. 1990) (explaining that a lawyer "must 
exercise the utmost care and caution to extract and not to inject information, and by all 
means to resist the temptation to influence or bias the testimony of the witnesses."); In re 
Eldridge, 82 N.Y. 161, 171 (1880) (stating that a lawyer's duty is "to extract the missing 
facts from the witness, not pour them into him; to learn what the witness does know, not to 
teach him what he ought to know."). 
See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 96 (1988) ("The 
interviewing and preparation of witnesses is part of the 'total war' concept of litigation, 
and it is a practice that, more than almost anything else, gives trial lawyers their reputation 
as purveyors of falsehoods."). 
See Applegate, supra note 1, at 281 n.12 ("[Tlrial lawyers have a tacit understanding 
that preparation activities are protected."); George T. Frarnpton, Some Practical and 
Ethical Problems of Prosecuting Public Oficials, 36 MD. L. REV. 5,33 (1976) (noting that 
witness preparation is customarily a one-on-one process with no records kept); Richard C. 
Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 23 (1995) (describing 
factors that make witness coaching difficult to expose). The practice of preparing a 
witness for trial is sometimes referred to as "horse-shedding," a term said to have been 
coined by James Fenimore Cooper. See GENE FOWLER, THE GREAT MOUTHPIECE: A 
LIFE STORY OF WILLIAM J. FALLON 93 (1931). According to Fowler, there were camage 
sheds near the courthouse in Cooper's day, and attorneys used these facilities to rehearse 
witnesses prior to trial. See also Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191,199 (1957) (Frankfurter, 
J., concumng) (referring to "horse-shedding" of an accused during police interrogation). 
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misleading testimony results, the only persons who know about it 
are the participants themsel~es.~ And the capacity of cross- 
examination to expose improper coaching is extremely limited? 
Given its controversial nature, one would expect the practice 
and ethics of witness coaching to have attracted close scrutiny by 
courts and commentators. Interestingly, however, the subject has 
received relatively modest a t tent i~n.~ A handful of judicialg and 
ethics opinionsI0 have discussed superficially the subject of witness 
Other commentators refer to "woodshedding" the witness. See, e.g., MONROE H .  
FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 149 (1990). 
A distinction should be made between preparing a witness's testimony, which is 
generally considered acceptable, and attempting to improperly influence, or "coach" 
testimony. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 90 n.3 (1976) ("An attorney must 
respect the important ethical distinction between discussing testimony and seeking 
improperly to influence it."). Ethics codes prohibit a lawyer from falsifying evidence or 
assisting a witness to testify falsely, fraudulently, or pejuriously. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . offer evidence 
that the lawyer knows to be false."); id. at R. 3.4(b) ("A lawyer shall not . . . falsify 
evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness 
that is prohibited by law."); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7- 
102(A)(4) (1980) ("In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not. . . [klnowingly use 
perjured testimony or false evidence."); id. at DR 7-102(A)(6) ("In his representation of a 
client, a lawyer shall not . . . [plarticipate in the creation or preservation of evidence when 
he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false."); id  at DR 7-102 (A)(7) ("In his 
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not . . . [c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that 
the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent."). However, apart from the truism that a 
lawyer should not suborn pe jury, neither the cases nor the codes delineate the critical and 
often tenuous distinction between proper and improper witness preparation. See Earp, 
571 A.2d at 1235 ("[Tlhe line that exists between perfectly acceptable witness preparation 
on the one hand, and impermissible influencing of the witness on the other hand, may 
sometimes be fine and difficult to discern."). 
See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text. 
See Applegate, supra note 1, at 279 ("Even though witness preparation occurs in 
practically every lawsuit, it is almost never taught in law school, not directly regulated, 
seldom discussed in scholarly literature, and rarely litigated."). 
See e.g., State v. McCormick, 259 S.E.2d 880 (N.C. 1979): 
It is not improper for an attorney to prepare his witness for trial, to explain the 
applicable law in any given situation and to go over before trial the attorney's 
questions and the witness' answers so that the witness will be ready for his 
appearance in court, will be more at ease because he knows what to expect, and 
will give his testimony in the most effective manner that he can. Such 
preparation is the mark of a good trial lawyer. 
Id at. 882-83; see afso Earp, 571 A.2d at 1227: 
The question of just how far an attorney may go in preparing a witness for trial is 
a difficult one. It involves ethical considerations as well as the possibility of 
tainting a witness to the extent that due process and the necessity for reliable 
evidence may justify the exclusion of that witness's testimony. 
Id. at 1234. 
lo D.C. Bar Op. No. 79 (Dec. 18,1979), reprinted in District of Columbia Bar, Code of 
Professional Responsibility and Opinions of the District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics 
Committee 138,139 (1991), stating: 
[A] lawyer may not prepare, or assist in preparing, testimony that he or she 
knows, or ought to know, is false or misleading. So long as this prohibition is not 
transgressed, a lawyer may properly suggest language as well as the substance of 
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preparation and coaching. Practitioner manuals typically offer 
general guidance on how to prepare witnesses,]' and occasionally 
address tactical and ethical issues involved in coaching.12 Scholarly 
commentary has examined the ethical limits of witness 
preparation, particularly by differentiating acceptable techniques 
from improper techniques, which promote false or misleading 
testimony.13 In addition, popular culture occasionally has 
dramatized the subject.I4 However, despite a discrete body of 
literature devoted to witness preparation generally, there has been 
very little discussion by courts and commentators on witness 
preparation and coaching by  prosecutor^.'^ 
The absence of critical examination of witness coaching by 
prosecutors is puzzling for two reasons. First, there is an 
increasing concern among courts, lawmakers, and commentators 
that some prosecutors use the adversary system not to serve truth, 
but for self-serving purposes.16 According to thls view, the conduct 
testimony, and may-indeed, s h o u l d d o  whatever is feasible to prepare his or 
her witness for examination. 
See, e.g., JEFFREY L. KESTLER, QUESTIONING TECHNIQUES AND TACTICS, $9 9:Ol- 
9:85 (3d ed. 1999); ROBERTO ARON & JONATHAN L. ROSNER, HOW TO PREPARE 
WITNESSES FOR TRIAL (2d ed. 1998); DANIEL I. SMALL, PREPARING WITNESSES: A
PRAC~ICAL GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND T H E I R  CLIENTS (1998); RONALD L. CARLSON &
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL PRACTICE $ 9.4, at 181-83 (2d ed. 
1995). 
'2 See infra notes 136-53 and accompanying text. 
13 See Fred C. Zacharias & Shaun Martin, Coaching Witnesses, 87 KY. L.J. 1001 (1998- 
99); Wydick, supra note 5; Applegate, supra note 1; Joseph D. Piorkowski, Professional 
Conduct and the Preparation of Witnesses for Trial: Defining the Acceptable Limitations of 
'Coaching', 1 GEO. J .  LEGAL ETHICS 389 (1 987). 
l4 Probably the most famous dramatization of witness coaching is the "lecture" in the 
novel, Anatomy of a Murder. See ROBERT RAVERS, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958) 
(depicting a defense attorney who outlines for his client four possible defenses to a charge 
of murder, rejects three of them as inapplicable, but suggests, hypothetically, that a legal 
excuse might be available for a killing committed in a blind rage. He then terminates the 
interview, instructing his client to think about the incident). For references to coaching in 
the film, THE VERDICT, and the television series, L.A. Law, see Zacharias & Martin, 
supra note 13, at 1002-03. 
But see Flowers, supra note 2, at 739-66. A highly effective dramatization of 
prosecutorial coaching is depicted in the television series, The Practice. A defendant is 
being prosecuted for murdering his wife. His defense is suicide, and circumstantial 
evidence strongly supports the defense. During a pretrial interview with the brother of the 
deceased, who believes the defendant killed his sister, the prosecutor suggests that the 
witness can strengthen the prosecution's case, and then "lectures" the brother on the 
hearsay rule, and the admissibility of statements of a present state of mind. The brother 
picks up on the prosecutor's obvious cue, and subsequently testifies to several devastating 
statements that he claims his sister made shortly before her death, describing her strong 
will to live, and suggesting that if anything happens to her, her husband is the cause. See 
The Practice (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 8,2000). 
l6  For recent decisions finding that prosecutors suborned perjury, see Boyette v. 
Lefevre, 246 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2001); Commonwealth of Northern Mariana v. Bowie, 243 
F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. LaPage, 231 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 2000). For 
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of some prosecutors in investigating cases and preparing witnesses 
to give testimony is undertaken not to ascertain, present, and 
protect the truth, but rather to manipulate the truth in order to 
secure a conviction. 
Second, there is an increasing concern-amply documented 
by recent reports of wrongful convictions-that the criminal justice 
system is seriously prone to error." Critics contend that these 
errors are attributable to defects in the adversarial trial process, 
mostly from incompetent representation by defense lawyers and 
trial errors by  prosecutor^.^^ However, recent disclosures suggest 
that the origin of many, perhaps most, of these miscarriages of 
justice occurs before the cases actually reach the courtroom for 
Congressional actions imposing ethical and civil liabilities on prosecutors, see 28 U.S.C. § 
530B (1994) (codifying the "Citizens Protection Act," mandating that federal prosecutors 
comply with state rules of professional ethics); 18 U.S.C. 5 3006A (1994) (codifying the 
"Hyde Amendment," imposing monetary costs on federal prosecutors for bad faith 
conduct). For commentary in the media, see Robyn E. Blumner, Prosec~ttors Should 
Rethink Their Goals, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 6, 2001, at ID; Ken Armstrong & 
Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Proseclttors Sacrifice Justice to Win, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 
10, 1999, at 3; Bill Moushey, Win at All Costs: Government Misconduct in the Name of 
Expedient Jicstice, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1998, at I. 
" S e e  JAMES LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES I N  CAPITAL 
CASES, 1973-1995, at 5 (2000) (discussing a massive study of every capital punishment case 
in the U.S. between 1973-1995 and documenting that the overall error rate in capital 
punishment system was 68 percent, and that 82 percent of all capital judgments reversed 
on appeal (247 out of 301) were replaced on retrial with a sentence less than death, or no 
sentence at all); J IM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000) (offering a compendium 
of anecdotal accounts, and legal and social science scholarship, of miscarriages of justice in 
American criminal trials); DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, THE DEATH 
PENALTY I N  1999, YEAR END REPORT, at 1 (2000) (84 inmates on Death Row exonerated 
since 1973); NH'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
HANDLING APPLICATIONS FOK POSTCONVICTION D A TESTING, at 7 (Feb. 1999) (draft 
report) ("[Alt least 55 convictions in the United states have been vacated on the basis of 
DNA results."); NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY 
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN T H E  USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996) (evaluating twenty-eight cases in which 
DNA evidence established post-trial innocence); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. 
Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 36, 71 
(1987) (claiming that more than 350 people in this century have been erroneously 
convicted in the U.S. of crimes punishable by death; 116 of those were sentenced to death 
and 23 were actually executed); Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Nov. 1999, at 68 ("[Slurely the number of innocent people discovered and freed from 
prison is only a small fraction of those still incarcerated."); Arye Rattner, Convicted but 
Innocent: Wrongfitl Conviction and the Criminal Jilstice System, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
283, 289-92 (1988) (explaining that a study of more than 200 felony cases of wrongful 
conviction found misidentification to be the single largest source of error, accounting for 
more than half of cases that had one main cause); Marty I. Rosenbaum, Inevitable Error: 
Wrongfitl New York State Homicide Convictions, 1965-1988, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 807, 809 (1991) (claiming that New York State leads all states in executing the 
innocent, evidenced by the fact that eight New Yorkcrs have been executed in error). 
I s  See LIEBMAN El' AL., supra note 17, at 5 (noting that incompetent defense lawyering 
accounted for 37 percent of the state post-conviction reversals of capital cases; 
prosecutorial misconduct accounted for 16-19 percent of all reversals). 
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trial. Indeed, the inability of criminal trials to produce accurate 
results may be attributable in many cases to techniques used by 
prosecutors to prepare, shape, and polish the testimony of their 
witnesses. 
Absent any contemporaneous record of a prosecutor's pretrial 
interaction with witnesses,19 it is exceedingly difficult for observers 
to investigate the preparation process to ascertain the extent to 
which prosecutors or police may have improperly influenced 
witnesses overtly, covertly, or even unwittingly to give false or 
misleading testimony.20 Moreover, the difficulty of analyzing the 
witness-preparation process is compounded by the failure of courts 
and prosecutors to recognize or appreciate how cognitive factors 
such as mernory,2' and suggestion2han affect the 
accuracy and truth of a witness's testimony. 
Given the secrecy surrounding the prosecutor's preparation of 
her witnesses and the inability to review the process meaningfully, 
it is virtually impossible to ascertain whether and to what extent 
witnesses have been coached by prosecutors and police to give 
false or misleading testimony. Nevertheless, inferences can be 
drawn from cases, commentary, and empirical evidence to 
illuminate this murky process. First, it is indisputable that some 
prosecutors coach witnesses with the deliberate objective of 
promoting false or misleading testimony. Prosecutors do this 
primarily to (1) eliminate inconsistencies between a witness's 
earlier statements and her present testimony, (2) avoid details that 
'9 See Frampton, supra note 5, at 33 (describing witness preparation by prosecutor and 
government witness as a one-on-one process with no records kept). Although this Article 
focuses primarily on the prosecutor's pretrial interaction with government witnesses, it is 
common knowledge that other law enforcement officials such as federal agents and state 
and local police officers play a critical role in influencing the witness's testimony through 
interviewing and debriefing the witness during the early stages of an investigation. 
Prosecutors have a constitutional duty to familiarize themselves with police encounters 
with witnesses, and to obtain from police all relevant information. See Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419,437 (1995) ("[TJhe individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable 
evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the 
police."). Thus, any falsification, concealment, or manipulation by police of information 
pertaining to statements by witnesses is attributable constitutionally to the prosecutor. 
20 See Wydick, supra note 5, at 25 (describing covert methods lawyers can employ to 
induce a witness to give false testimony). 
21 See infra notes 44-67 and accompanying text. 
See infra notes 68-83 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 84-113 and accompanying text. 
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might embarrass the witness and weaken her testimony, and (3) 
conceal information that might reveal that the prosecutor has 
suppressed evidence. 
Additionally, prosecutors have the ability, consciously or 
unconsciously, to strengthen the case by questions and suggestions 
that cause the witness to fill gaps in memory, eliminate ambiguities 
or contradictions, sharpen language, create emphasis, and alter 
demeanor. Some witnesses, moreover, are vulnerable to 
prosecutorial suggestions, or receptive to prosecutorial cues. 
Indeed, the prosecutor's interaction with the cooperating witness is 
a paradigmatic example of the dangers and abuses of coaching. 
Finally, the absence of any contemporaneous record of the 
prosecutor's preparation of witnesses encourages improper 
coaching by hiding the process from meaningful oversight by 
courts or defense counsel. Without some basis to believe that 
coaching occurred, a court would not invoke prophylactic 
safeguards to detect or prevent coaching. And absent any 
documentation of the witness-preparation process, the defense 
lawyer has no basis to challenge the witness's testimony as the 
product of improper conduct by the prosecution. 
A. Incentives for Coaching 
1. Eliminate Discrepancies 
A prosecutor bent on obtaining a conviction may attempt to 
eliminate any significant inconsistencies in a witness's testimony. 
Some prosecutors overtly influence their witness to alter 
materially an earlier, inconsistent version. In Kyles v. Whi t le~ ,~~ a 
capital murder case, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Isaac 
Smallwood, a key eyewitness who gave an extremely detailed 
description of the killing. Smallwood claimed he saw Kyles 
struggle with the victim, produce a small, black .32 caliber gun 
from his right pocket, shoot the victim, and then drive off in the 
victim's LTD.25 The prosecutor argued to the jury: "Isaac 
Smallwood, have you ever seen a better witness[?]"26 
However, in a statement Smallwood made to the police 
shortly after the killing, which the prosecutor did not disclose to 
the defense, Smallwood gave a vastly different account of the 
crime. He told the police that he did not see the actual killing, did 
24 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
25 Id. at 442-43. 
26 Id. at 444. 
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not see the assailant outside the victim's vehicle, and saw the 
assailant for the first time driving toward him in a Th~nderbird.~' 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the 
prosecutor violated his constitutional obligation to disclose this 
information to the defense.28 The majority opinion, however, 
noted how Smallwood's original story apparently had been 
"adjust[ed]" by the prosecutor by the time of the Disclosure 
of the earlier statements, the majority observed, not only would 
have "destroyed confidence in Smallwood's story," but also would 
have "rais[ed] a substantial implication that the prosecutor had 
coached him to give it."30 
A major incentive for prosecutors to use cooperating 
witnesses is to support an uncertain but consistent version of the 
facts, rather than to confirm an inconsistent version of the facts 
that may represent more of the truth." As an example, one writer 
describes a proffer session in which a cooperating witness has 
identified several people as being present at a meeting to 
distribute The witness fails to identify a particular 
individual as being present. The prosecutor, however, firmly 
believes from other evidence that this person was present at the 
meeting. When asked specifically whether this person was present, 
See id. at 443. Smallwood's statement, taken at the parking lot, claimed that he had 
not seen the actual murder and had not seen the assailant outside the vehicle. "I heard a 
lound [sic] pop . . . . When I looked around I saw a lady laying on the ground, and there 
was a red car coming toward me." Id. When a police investigator specifically asked 
Smallwood whether he had seen the assailant outside the car, Smallwood answered that he 
had not; the gunman "was already in the car and coming toward me." Id. Smallwood 
described the killer as a black teenage male with a mustache and shoulder length braided 
hair. Kyles had no mustache and wore his hair in a "bush" style. Id. at 443. 
28 "In this case, disclosure of the suppressed evidence to competent counsel would 
have made a different result reasonably probable." Id. at 441. 
29 The struggle and shooting, which earlier he had not seen, he was able to describe 
with such detailed clarity as to identify the murder weapon as a small black .32-caliber 
pistol, which, of course, was the type of weapon used. His description of the victim's car 
had gone from a "Thunderbird" to an "LTD"; and he saw fit to say nothing about the 
assailant's shoulder-length hair and mustache, details noted by no other eyewitness. Id. at 
443. 
"The implication of coaching would have been complemented by the fact that 
Smallwood's testimony at the second trial was much more precise and incriminating than 
his testimony at the first, which produced a hung jury." Id. at 443 n.14. 
31 See Randolph N .  Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Miscondi~ct, 23 C K I M .  L. BULL. 
550, 559 (1987) ("The natural inclination is not to see inconsistent or contradictory 
evidence for what it is, but to categorize it as irrelevant or a petty incongruity."); Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and 
Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 945 (1999) ("Prosecutors are convinced they 
have the guilty guy, then they go about seeking to convict and do not carefully look at 
things that are funny about their case."). See also Applegate, supra note 1, at 328 ("[A] 
major incentive for trial preparation is to obtain support for an uncertain version of the 
facts and not to confirm a version of the facts that appears to represent the whole truth."). 
32 See Yaroshefsky, supra note 31, at 959. 
Heinonline - -  23 Cardozo L. Rev. 835 2001-2002 
836 CARDOZO L A W  REVIEW [Vol. 23:3 
the witness repeats that he was not present. The witness is asked: 
"Are you telling me that [he] was not there?" The witness now 
knows what the prosecutor wants to hear. After a break, when the 
witness is asked again, he now remembers that this individual was 
there. 
2. Avoid Embarrassing Details 
Some prosecutors attempt to influence the testimony of 
witnesses to conceal information that might embarrass the witness 
and weaken the prosecutor's case. As a consequence, the witness 
may be coached to give testimony that may be literally true but 
creates a false or misleading impression, while allowing the 
prosecutor to avoid a charge of outright solicitation of perjury. 
One method of evasion is to instruct the witness to claim a lack of 
memory or knowledge about a question that may be embarrassing 
or otherwise harmful." A prosecutor might reinforce this subtle 
message by reassuring the witness that while he has a duty to 
answer every question truthfully, an answer such as "I don't know" 
or "I don't remember" is a perfectly acceptable response when the 
witness is not absolutely certain of the answer.34 
Another strategy of concealment is to instruct the witness to 
answer only the question asked, and not to volunteer 
informati~n.~~ An example is Alcorta v. Texas,3Yn which the 
Supreme Court reversed the defendant's murder conviction for 
stabbing his wife to death. The defendant admitted the killing but 
claimed it occurred in a fit of passion after discovering his wife, 
33 See James M. Altman, Witness Preparation Conflicts, LITIG., Fall 1995, at 38, 43 
("[W]itnesses often receive instructions that, if true, 'I do not recall' is a perfectly proper- 
indeed, an optimal-response to opposing counsel's thorny questions. Sometimes 
witnesses translate this advice, when coupled with an attorney's other statements, into a 
suggestion that harmful facts should not be remembered."); Christopher T. Lutz, Fudging 
and Forgetting, LITIG., Spring 1993, at 10, 11 (describing advice on lack of memory as an 
"all-purpose life preserver" that attorneys provide to their witnesses). 
04 Literally truthful testimony is not perjurious, even if it is misleading or evasive. See 
Bronston v. Unitcd States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973). However, a hlse claim of lack of memory 
may result in a perjury conviction. See United States v. Barnhart, 889 F.2d 1374, 1376-80 
(5th Cir. 1989) (upholding a perjury conviction for witness's testimony before a grand jury 
claiming lack of memory when corporate official instructed him to "get d u m b  when 
testifying on certain matters); Sheriff, Clark County v. Hecht, 710 P.2d 728 (Nev. 1985) 
(upholding a charge of subornation of perjury for witness's testimony, pursuant to 
attorney's instructions, that he did not remember). 
35 See Altman, supra note 33, at 43 (arguing that instructing a witness not to volunteer 
information, and to answer only the question asked, "can become part of a general 
strategy of concealment and evasion"). 
36 355 U.S. 28 (1957). 
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whom he had already suspected of marital infidelity, kissing one 
Castelleja late at night in a parked car. Castelleja, the only 
eyewitness to the killing, testified that his relationship with the 
deceased had been nothing more than a casual friend~hip;~ and 
that he had driven her home from work on the night she was 
killed. 
However, during pretrial preparation, the witness told the 
prosecutor that he had had sexual intercourse with the defendant's 
wife on five or six occasions shortly before her death. This fact, if 
known or believed by the defendant, would have provided the 
defendant with a powerful motive for the killing. The prosecutor 
advised the witness that he should not volunteer any information 
about sexual intercourse but if specifically asked about it, to 
answer t ruthf~l ly.~~ The prosecutor's questions at trial, as reflected 
in one significant colloquy, were obviously designed to allow the 
witness to give literally truthful answers about his relationship with 
the deceased while carefully avoiding the subject of his sexual 
conduct with the de~eased.~' 
3. Conceal Suppressed Evidence 
A prosecutor may be motivated to engage in improper 
coaching to prevent the revelation of material information that the 
prosecutor did not disclose to the defense as required by due 
process."O Needless to say, a prosecutor who is predisposed to 
violate his constitutional and ethical obligation to disclose 
favorable evidence to a defendant is also capable of molding her 
witness's testimony to protect the nondisclosure from being 
37 Id. at 30. 
3 Id. at 31. 
3y The prosecutor questioned the witness as follows: 
Q. Natividad [Castilleja], were you in love with Herlinda [defendant's wife]? 
A. No. 
Q. Was she in love with you? 
A. No. 
Q. Had you ever talked about love? 
A. No. 
Q. Had you ever had any dates with her other than to take her home? 
A. No. Well, just when I brought her from there. 
Q. Just when you brought her from work? 
A. Yes. 
Id. at 30. 
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("We now hold that suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution."). 
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discovered." Indeed, it is arguable that every case in which a 
prosecutor deliberately conceals exculpatory evidence from the 
defense may also involve an effort by the prosecutor to coach the 
witness's testimony to hide the suppression. 
In Walker v. City of New Y ~ r k , ~ ~  for example, a prosecutor 
almost certainly coached a cooperating witness to give false 
testimony to conceal from the defense information that would 
have undermined the witness's credibility. Walker describes a 
prosecutor's debriefing and preparation of a cooperating witness 
in an investigation of the robbery of an armored truck and murder 
of the truck driver. At the initial proffer session, the witness 
identified two individuals as having participated in the crime. The 
prosecutor subsequently learned, however, that one of these 
alleged accomplices could not have committed the crime because 
he was in prison on the date of the robbery. Undeterred, the 
prosecutor elicited testimony from the cooperator in the grand 
jury and at trial that did not mention a second accomplice. The 
decision by the Second Circuit condemned the prosecutor's failure 
to disclose the inconsistency. The court did not discuss the reason 
for the witness's failure to mention the existence of a second 
perpetrator, an omission that undoubtedly resulted from careful 
coaching by the prosec~tor .~~ 
B. Cognitive Factors Facilitating Coaching 
1. Memory 
An extensive body of scientific literature holds that memory is 
highly fallible, and the process of memory retrieval and 
reconstruction extremely fragile.44 The perception of an event 
4 l  For examples of two recent Supreme Court cases suggesting that a prosecutor 
engaged in improper coaching in order to protect from disclosure his concealment of 
exculpatory evidence, see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
U.S. 419 (1995). 
42 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992). 
43 See nko Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc). For a 
discussion of the apparent coaching of several witnesses with the purpose of concealing 
exculpatory evidence that the prosecutor had failed to disclose to the defense, see Bennett 
L. Gershman, Film Review, The Thin Blue Line: Art or Trial in the Fact-Finding Process?, 
9 PACE L. REV. 275 (1989). 
There is a large body of psychological literature describing the vulnerability of 
memory. Several prominent studies include FREDERICK CHARLES BARTLETT, 
REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL ND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1997); 
ELIZABETH LORUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY 
(1994); ISRAEL ROSENFELD, THE INVENTION OF MEMORY: A NEW VIEW OF THE BRAIN 
(1988); GEORGE A. TALLAND, DISORDERS OF MEMORY AND LEARNING (1969). For a 
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typically does not leave a single, clear image; it is heavily 
influenced by a variety of factors, including the manner in which 
the memory is sought to be r e t r i e~ed .~~  Many studies describe the 
distorting effects of suggestive q~estioning.~~ Whereas witness 
preparation certainly can assist a witness in remembering and 
retrieving a truthful recollection, preparation also can distort a 
witness's underlying memory and produce a false rec~llection.~~ 
And because of the complex nature of memory, it may be difficult 
for the witness himself to distinguish between a genuine 
recollection of a previously unrecalled fact, and an imagined 
recollection based on suggestions from the inter~iewer.~~ 
Many prosecutors do not appreciate the dangers associated 
with retrieving a memory of an event.49 A prosecutor, through the 
use of questions and suggestions has the ability to influence a 
witness to remember facts and fill gaps that may be inaccurate, but 
which the witness may come to believe is the truth.50 In addition, 
because of the prosecutor's unique status as the attorney for the 
government, she ordinarily is viewed by the witness as a highly 
collection of recent scholarship on issues related to memory retention, retrieval, and 
distortion, see Yaroshefsky, supra note 31, at 11.174. 
45 See FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 152-56. 
See id. at 152 ("A common misconception about memory is that it is a process of 
reproducing or retrieving stored information, in the manner of a videotape or a computer. 
In fact, memory is much more a process of reconstruction."); Applegate, supra note 1, at 
329 ("Memory is not like a phonograph record; the perception of an event does not leave 
a single, clear imprint that can be replayed precisely and at will."); Michael Owen Miller, 
Working with Memory, LITIG., Summer 1993, at 10 , l l  (noting that memory is not a single 
mental process but involves three stages of acquisition, retention, and retrieval, each of 
which may be "enhanced, suppressed, or distorted"). 
47 See FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 156 (describing the "lawyer's dilemma" as needing 
to probe a client's memory to learn important facts, but by stressing the importance of 
particular facts, it may induce a client to "remember" a fact even if it did not occur); 
Miller, supra note 46, at 12 (explaining that memory retrieval is susceptible to the greatest 
amount of distortion). 
See Mi jan DamaSka, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U .  PA. 
L. REV. 1083 (1975): 
During the sessions devoted to "coaching," the future witness is likely to try to 
adapt himself to expectations mirrored in the interviewer's one-sided attitude. 
As a consequence, gaps in his memory may even unconsciously be filled out by 
what he thinks accords with the lawyer's expectations and are in tune with his 
thesis. Later, in court, these additions to memory images may appear to the 
witness himself as accurate reproductions of his original perceptions. 
Id. at 1094. 
49 See Yaroshefsky, supra note 31, at 953 ("Most prosecutors simply do not understand 
how memory works and the reality of truth."); Miller, supra note 46, at 11 ("[Llawyers are 
not memory specialists."). 
See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 86 (1950) (describing "inadvertent but 
innocent witness-coaching" attributable to competitive pressures of adversarial advocacy); 
Applegate, supra note 1, at 329 (describing that a lawyer's adversarial posture may 
unintentionally produce testimony that supports the lawyer's version of the facts, and the 
witness may be unaware that she is being manipulated). 
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knowledgeable official who can be trusted to use the facts 
re~ponsibly.~' Indeed, because of the prosecutor's power and 
prestige, the witness may try to conform his recollection of the 
event to what the witness believes the prosecutor wants to hear.52 
Experts and courts recognize that facts are slippery, and the 
process of memory retrieval can be treachero~s.~"~ Justice 
Stevens noted in Nix v. White~ide;~ "facts" often are highly 
ambiguous and uncertain. To an appellate court after a case has 
been tried and the evidence sifted by others, 
a particular fact may be as clear and certain as a piece of 
crystal or a small diamond. A trial lawyer, however, must 
often deal with mixtures of clay and sand. Even a pebble 
that seems clear enough at first glance may take on a 
different hue in a handful of graveless 
And to experts who have studied the psychology of human 
memory, a witness's recollection of an event is a delicate amalgam 
that is retrieved, reconstructed, or imagined from this combination 
of clay, sand, and gra~el .~" 
The potential for witness coaching by prosecutors and police 
to alter memory is powerfully illustrated in the Supreme Court's 
decision in Strickler v. Greene.57 In Strickler, a capital murder trial, 
a key prosecution witness, Anne Stolzfus, initially told police that 
she had only "muddled memories" about a kidnapping in a mall, 
and could not identify the perpetrators, the victim, or the 
51 This observation is usually made in connection with a jury's respect for the 
prosecutor's prestige and expertise, and its confidence in the prosecutor's judgement. See 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985) ("[P]rosecutor's opinion canies with it 
the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's 
judgment rather than its own view of the evidence."); United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 
1173 (2d Cir. 1981): 
The prosecutor is cloaked with the authority of the United States Government; 
he stands before the jury as the community's representative. His remarks are 
those, not simply of an advocate, but rather of a federal official duty-bound to 
see that justice is done. . . . [I]t may be difficult for [the jury] to ignore his views, 
however biased and baseless they may be. 
Id. at 1178-79. The same observation, I believe, applies to a non-hostile government 
witness' perception of the prosecutor's status and expertise. 
52 See DamaSlta, supra note 48. 
53 See LOFI'US & KETCHAM, supra note 44, at 169 (describing how memory "grows," 
rather than "fades," because "every time we recall an event we must reconstruct the 
memory, and so each time it is changed--colored by succeeding events, increased 
understanding, a new context, suggestions by others, other people's recollections."); Kyles 
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 444 (1995) ("[Tlhe evolution over time of a given eyewitness's 
description can be fatal to its reliability."). 
-54 475 US. 157,190 (1 986) (concurring opinion). 
55 Id. 
Sh See supra note 44 for a list of prominent studies on this topic. 
57 527 U.S. 263 (1999). 
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a~tomobi le .~~ At trial, however, Stolzfus gave astonishingly 
detailed testimony about the event.5y She gave a detailed 
description of all three perpetrators? the victim:' and even 
remembered the license plate number of the van.62 Denying the 
suggestion that she had learned these details from news reports, 
she answered, "I have an exceptionally good memory."63 
'The process by which Stolzfus' memory improved so 
remarkably, however, was revealed in a series of documents 
prepared by a police detective, which were never disclosed to the 
58 Stolzfus first spoke to the police two weeks after the crime, a few days after 
discussing the incident with classmates at James Madison University, where both shc and 
the victim, Leanne Whitlock, were students. See id. at 270. According to notes of this first 
interview (Exhibit I), Stolzfus told Detective Claytor that she could not identify the black 
female victim, nor the two white male perpetrators, but coultl identify the white female 
perpetrator. See id. at 274. In a letter written to Detective Claytor threc days later 
(Exhibit 4), Stolzfus states, "that she had not remembered being at the mall, but that her 
daughter had helped jog her memory." Ill. She wrote: "I have a very vague memory that 
I'm not sure of." Id. In another notc to Claytor (Exhibit S), Stolzfus described "the car," 
but did not mention the license plate number. In another letter to Claytor (Exhibit 7), 
Stolzfus thanked Claytor for his "patience with my sometimes muddled memories." Id. In 
another note (Exhibit S), Stolzfus commented that "I totally wrote this off as a trivial 
episode of college kids carrying on and proceeded with my own full-time college load." 
Id. at 275. 
5y She testified to seeing the perpetrators earlier in a music store, described their 
appearance and behavior in detail, thought they looked "revved up" and "very impatient," 
bumped into one of them, and thought she felt something hard in the pocket of his coat. 
See id. at 271. She left the store, but again encountered the threesome, one of whom 
bumped into Stolzfus and asked directions to the bus stop. Stolzfus tried to follow them 
"because of her concern about petitioner's behavior," but "lost him." Id. She later saw 
the petitioner "tearing out of the mall entrance door and went up to the driver of the van." 
Id. He "pounded on" the passenger window, "shook the car, yanked the door open, and 
jumped in." Id. The victim started blowing her horn a long time, and petitioner "started 
hitting her." Id. at 272. And lie "started hitting her on the head and I was, I just became 
concerned and upset." Id. Stolzfus pulled up alongside the other car; the driver looked 
"frozen" and "mouthed an inaudible response." Id. Stozfus started to drive away and 
then realized "the only word that it could possibly be, was help." Id. 
Stolzfus testified that Strickler wore a grey T-shirt with a Harley Davidson insignia 
on it, and had "a kind of multi-layer look." Id. at 270 n.5. Co-defendant Henderson "had 
either a white or light colored shirt, probably a short sleeve knit shirt and his pants were 
neat. They weren't just old blue jeans. They may have been new blue jeans or it may have 
been more dressy slacks of some sort." The woman "had blonde hair, it was kind of in a 
shaggy cut down the back. She had blue eyes, she had a real sweet smile, kind of a small 
mouth. Just a touch of freckles on her face." Id. 
She testified that this woman was "beautiful . . . well dressed and she was happy, she 
was singing." Id. at 271. 
62 Stolzfus stated that the license plate was West Virginia, NKA 243, which she 
remembered instructing her daughter to write down, and said she was able to remember 
the number because she used the phrase, "No Kids Alone" and " I said 243 is my age." Ill. 
at 272 n.7. 
63 Id. at 272. Stolzfus added that "1 had very close contact with [petitioner] and he 
made an emotional impression with me because of his behavior and I ,  he caught my 
attention and I paid attention." Id. at 272-73. 
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defense.@ These documents were based on interviews between 
Detective Claytor and Stolzfus in which her memory continued to 
expand over time because, she claimed, of "the associations that 
[Detective Claytor] helped me make."65 The Supreme Court 
addressed whether the prosecutor violated his constitutional duty 
by not disclosing these statements to the defense. The Court 
found no violation.66 The Court never discussed the other 
important question, i.e., whether the prosecutor and police 
encouraged Stolzfus to reconstruct her memory to accord with the 
government's theory of 
2. Language and Communication 
Prosecutors may attempt to fill gaps by asking questions, 
making statements, or displaying evidence that highlights specific 
facts." Indeed, several former prosecutors found it "disturbing" 
and "dangerous" that so many prosecutors gave facts to 
cooperating witnesses in the course of eliciting information from 
them.69 Moreover, the language used by a prosecutor in 
communicating those facts to the witness may significantly 
influence the witness's responses. Experts have shown that using 
specific words in a question can distort a witness's recollection or 
recounting of an event.70 For example, asking a witness whether 
Of the eight documents either prepared by Claytor or received by him from Stolzfus, 
it is undisputed that at least five of those documents "were known to the State but not 
disclosed to trial counsel." Id. at 282. It is unclear whether the prosecuting attorney knew 
about some or all of these documents at the time he proceeded to trial. He claimed that 
he never saw five of the exhibits until long after trial, and that they were not in the file he 
made available to petitioner. Id. at 275. The prosecutor claimed that three of the exhibits 
had been in his open file, but defense counsel maintained otherwise. Id. at 275 n.11. 
65 Id. at 274. 
66 The majority concluded that although the prosecutor suppressed several items of 
favorable evidence which would have severely impeached Stolzfus, id. at 282, there was 
ample other evidence of Strickler's involvement. Therefore, the petitioner failed to 
dcmonstrate that there is a "reasonable probability" that his conviction or sentence would 
have been different had the Stolzfus materials been disclosed. Id. at 296. Justice Souter, 
joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented, arguing that "the likely havoc that an informed 
cross-examiner could have wreaked upon Stolzfus" would have been "sufficient to 
undermine confidence that the death recommendation would have been the choice." Id. 
at 304. 
67 For a critical analysis of Strickler, see Stephen A. Saltzburg, Perjury and False 
Testimony: Should the Difference Matter So Much?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537 (2000). 
a See Yaroshefsky, supra note 31, at 960 (noting that many prosecutors "show 
evidence to a witness"). 
69 See id. 
70 See Piorkowski, supra note 13, at 399-402 (describing how a witness' choice of 
certain words can significantly affect the substantive meaning of the testimony); see also 
Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912, 917 (Wyo. 1992) (describing how an attorney suggested 
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he saw "a" car is much less suggestive than asking the witness 
whether he saw "the" car.7' Similarly, asking the witness whether a 
person "smashed" another's face may produce a decidedly 
different response than asking the witness whether a person "hit" 
the other person.72 
Prosecutors have the ability by their choice of language to 
telegraph to the witness specific facts that the prosecutor wants the 
witness to say. For example, when a witness initially is uncertain 
of the identity of persons who were present at a critical meeting, a 
prosecutor could properly try to refresh the witness's recollection 
by asking him whether a named person was present.73 However, if 
the witness continues to express doubt, a prosecutor who focuses 
repeatedly on whether that person was present is ultimately going 
to convey to the witness the prosecutor's expectations and the 
witness eventually will get the message and say it.74 
Many prosecutors appear to be unaware of the extent to 
which they express verbally or non-verbally a genuine interest in 
certain facts, or communicate disappointment when the witness 
does not know particular facts, and thereby tip off the witness to 
what they want him to say.75 Some prosecutors are not subtle 
about this type of communicative message. A prosecutor, for 
example, might signal to a cooperating witness, either explicitly or 
implicitly, that he is not helping himself by omitting certain details. 
According to several former prosecutors, the witness "somehow 
now for the first time . . . finds information that helps the 
government ."76 
Presuppositions or assumptions in questions also can create a 
false recollection. For example, after being intensively questioned 
by the prosecutor about whether the target of an investigation 
displayed a gun, the witness might acknowledge that he 
remembers a gun because the story has become implanted in his 
mind as a fact, either because he heard about it from others rather 
than observing it firsthand, or because the prosecutor strongly 
that defendant employ the word "cut" instead of "stabbed" to describe the incident). 
7' See Wydick, supra note 5, at 43 (noting that using "the" tips off the witness that the 
questioner thinks such a fact more likely occurred, whereas using "a" keeps the questioner 
in a more neutral position). 
72 See FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 155. 
73 See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. 
74 See Yaroshefsky, supra note 31, at 959-61. 
75 See id. at 959 ("Prosecutors appear to be unaware of the extent to which they 
express, verbally and/or non-verbally:that they are disappointed that the cooperator does 
not know particular facts or that they express a genuine interest in information about a 
particular person."). 
76 Id. 
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suggested the fact.77 Asking a witness to retell an event over and 
over may convince the witness that his story is true.78 
There are several communicative techniques that interviewers 
use to shape a witness's testimony.79 Among the most common are 
asking leading questions,80 showing a witness a document to 
refresh her recollection,R1 informing a witness of what another 
witness has said about the incident,x2 and giving the witness a 
lecture on the consequences of saying one thing or another.83 
C. Dangerous Witnesses 
Some witnesses are especially vulnerable to coercive or 
suggestive interviewing techniques. The most susceptible of these 
witnesses are (1) children, because of their immaturity and 
impressionability; (2) identification witnesses, because of the 
inherent unreliability of eyewitness testimony; and (3) cooperating 
witnesses, because of their enormous incentives to falsify or 
embellish. 
1. Children 
Some witnesses are especially vulnerable to suggestive 
interviewing techniques. A familiar and frequently cited example 
is the testimony of young children in sexual abuse cases. Many 
instances of wrongful convictions are attributable to the testimony 
of child witnessesx4 Courts have increasingly scrutinized the 
reliability of the testimony of young children for coercive or 
77 See id. at 956-57. 
78 See FRANK, supra note 50, at 86 ("Telling and re-telling it to the lawyer, [the 
witness] will honestly believe that his story. . . is true."). 
79 See Wydick, slrpra note 5, at 41 -44. 
See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. 
8' See infra note 150 and accompanying text. 
See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
8-1 See infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
See Dana D. Anderson, Assessing the Reliability of Child Testimony in Sex~lal Abuse 
Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 21 17, 21 17 n.1 (1996) (claiming that of the thirty child sexual 
abuse cases that went to trial in the 1980s, more than half of the convictions were reversed 
on appeal for tainted testimony of child witnesses); Angcla R. Dunn, Questioning the 
Reliability of Chilllren's Testinzony: An Examination of the Problematic Elements, 19 LAW 
& PSYCHOI,. REV. 203, 203-09 (1995) (describing "widespread concern about the 
reliability of the child's statements" and factors affecting unreliability); Carey Goldberg, 
Youths' 'Tainted' Testinzony is Barred in Day Care Retrial, N.Y. T IMES ,  June 13, 1998, at 
A6 (discussing several reversals of convictions in sexual abuse trials and increasing 
concern over reliability of child witnesses). 
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suggestive pretrial interviewing techniq~es.~~ For example, in 
Idaho v. the Supreme Court found that a child's 
accusation of sexual abuse was based on suggestive and leading 
questioning by an interrogator who had a preconceived idea of 
what the child should be disclo~ing.~~ Additionally, courts have 
also focused on the absence of spontaneous recall, the bias of the 
interviewer, the use of leading questions, multiple interviews, 
incessant questioning, vilification of the defendant, ongoing 
contact with peers and references to their statements, and the use 
of threats, bribes, and cajoling.88 Courts have also noted the failure 
to videotape or otherwise document the initial interview ses~ion.~" 
2. Identification Witnesses 
Identification witnesses are among the most unreliable 
witnesse~.~ As noted above,gl these witnesses may adapt their 
testimony to what they believe accords with the prosecutor's 
8 See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561 
(8th Cir. 1997); State v. Gersin, 668 N.E.2d 486 (Ohio 1996); State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 
1372 (N.J. 1994); People v. Alvarez, 607 N.Y.S.2d 573 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993); State v. 
Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329 (Iowa 1992). 
86 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
87 Id. at 826 ("We think the Supreme Court of Idaho properly focused on the 
presumptive unreliability of the out-of-court statements and on the suggestive manner in 
which Dr. Jambura conducted the interview."). 
See cases cited supra note 85. 
@ See Wright, 497 U.S. at 812 (noting that "questions and answers were not recorded 
on videotape for preservation and perusal by the defense at or before trial") (quoting 
State v. Giles, 775 P.2d 1224,1227 (Idaho 1989)). 
See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,228-29 (1967) ("The vagaries of eyewitness 
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of 
mistaken identification."); EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932) 
(documenting sixty-two American and three British cases of convictions of innocent 
defendants); FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 30 (1927) 
("The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such 
testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English 
and American trials."); Jennifer L. Davenport, et. al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 3 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 338 (1997) (noting that "both archival studies and 
psychological research suggest that eyewitnesses are frequently mistaken in their 
identification"); Rattner, supra note 17, at 289-92 (1988) (describing a study of more than 
200 felony cases of wrongful conviction that found misidentification to be the single largest 
source of error, accounting for more than half of the cases that had one main error); Jim 
Yardley, In Deatlz Row Dispute, A Witness Stands Firm, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,2000, at A22 
(discussing recent execution of Gary Graham in Texas after years of litigation and public 
controversy over the accuracy of a highly questionable identification by only one 
eyewitness). The many recent exonerations of defendants by DNA evidence further 
underscores the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. See Bennett L. Gershman, The 
Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J .  LEGAL ETHICS 309,312-13 (2001). 
fl See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
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expectations. Prosecutors may also attempt to "adjust" the 
testimony of these witnesses to strengthen the probative impact of 
their identifi~ation.~~ These witnesses may add facts to their 
memory that appear to the witness to be an accurate reproduction 
of what the witness originally perceived. This process of "memory 
adjustment" is exemplified by the testimony of Ann Stolzfus in 
Strickler v. G1-eene,9~ and Isaac Smallwood in Kyles v. Whit le~ .~~ 
This adjustment often involves the testimony of identifying 
witnesses that the prosecutor knows is factually weak or 
unreliable, but is presented to the jury with an aura of certainty 
and confiden~e.~~ 
The testimony of several eyewitnesses in the murder trial of 
Randall Dale Adams, memorialized in the film documentary The 
Thin Blue Line," offers a dramatic commentary on the dangers of 
testimony of identification witnesses. Three rebuttal witnesses- 
Emily Miller, her husband R.L. Miller, and Michael Randall- 
offered critical testimony identifying Adams as the killer.97 The 
92 The technique used by a prosecutor in adjusting the testimony of his identification 
witness probably would not be as heavy-handed as the example used by Zacharias and 
Martin to describe an "outrageous" instance of the promotion of pe jury. See Zacharias & 
Martin, supra note 13, at 1003-04 (describing an attorney who asked a witness whether [he 
had] "ever known [the defendant] to be violent?" When the witness responds, "Not 
really," the lawyer immediately replies, "The answer is 'No."'). Assuming the witness 
responds to the prosecutor's question by answering, "I think that the person I saw was the 
defendant," it is highly unlikely that a prosecutor would reply, "The answer is it was the 
defendant." A prosecutor would carefully and patiently question the witness to establish 
the witness's ability to recognize people and events generally, the importance to the case 
of the identification evidence. The prosecutor might also possibly describe the existence 
of other evidence implicating the defendant, and then review the witness's testimonial 
certainty of the identification. The prosecutor's conduct in the latter example would 
almost certainly not provoke the outrage produced by the earlier example. 
y3 527 U.S. 263 (1999); see supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text. 
514 U.S. 419 (1995); see supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text. 
Ys Prosecutors are far better than juries at judging the reliability of identification 
evidence. Prosecutors know more about the case, more about the techniques of 
interviewing witnesses, and presumably are aware of the inherent dangers of eyewitness 
testimony. See Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification nnd Proof 
of Gililt, 16 J .  LEGAL STUD. 395, 446 (1987) ("There is every reason to believe that 
prosecutors, with more information at their disposal and more experience, are 
considerably better than juries at judging identification in criminal cases."). 
" THE THIN BLUE LINE (Miramax Films 1988); see also Gershman, supra note 43. 
Emily Miller, waving her finger toward Randall Adarns, testified: "[Tlhat's the 
man-1 saw that man! I saw Randall Adarns' face just right after. . . 1 saw the gun sticking 
out of the car when he shot that police officer, and that's the man." R.L. Miller stated: 
1 really didn't see anything inside. It was kind o f .  . . shadows on the window 
and stuff. But when he rolled down the window was what made his face stand 
out so .  . . . He had a beard, mustache, kind of dishwater-blond hair. But like I 
say, when he was in court, he sure looked a lot different. 
Michael Randall stated that he "developed something like total recall." However, 
his testimony contradicted this claim. He stated: 
The officer, he walked up to the vehicle. His car was . . . let me see . . . I don't 
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testimony was given confidently, with some bravado. However, as 
depicted in the film, these witnesses appeared to have given 
contrived testimony that probably was the product of coaching by 
the prose~utor .~~ Indeed, these witnesses' subsequent narrations of 
their accounts of the incident for the camera-a starkly revealing 
portrait that captures their venality and deception-is a 
devastating commentary of the artificiality of courtroom testimony 
and how a prosecutor's apparent coaching produced a terrible 
miscarriage of justice. 
3. Cooperating Witnesses 
The cooperating witness is probably the most dangerous 
prosecution witness of all. No other witness has such an 
extraordinary incentive to lie. Furthermore, no other witness has 
the capacity to manipulate, mislead, and deceive his investigative 
and prosecutorial handlers. For the prosecutor, the cooperating 
witness provides the most damaging evidence against a defendant, 
is capable of lying convincingly, and typically is believed by the 
know if it was behind or in front, but I know he had him pulled over, and he was 
up to the car. I think he was up to the car. Let me think. Yeah, he was up to 
the car. He had to have been up to the car. He was up to the car. I didn't see 
no bullet. I didn't see no gunfire. Because I went on. 
Id. at 287-94. 
98 The testimony of Emily Miller and Michael Randall was perjured, according to the 
Texas district court following an evidentiary hearing on Adam's application for state 
habeas corpus relief. See Ex parte Adam, No. W-77-1286-I(B) (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 
Dallas County) at 12-13, 15-16, affd, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc). 
Emily Miller gave a statement to the police in which she described the assailant as "either 
a Mexican or a very light skinned black man." Adams is a white man. This statement was 
not disclosed to the defense. Emily Miller viewed a line-up in which Adams was present. 
She identified someone other than Adarns-"I picked out a bushy-haired man." She 
asked a police officer whether she identified the "right man," and he told her she 
identified the "wrong man," and then pointed out Adams as the "right man." R.L. Miller 
viewed the same line-up and did not pick out Adam because "he didn't get that good a 
look at him." Also suppressed by the prosecutor was evidence that the Millers were 
motivated to accuse Adams to collect a very large reward, and the pendency of serious 
criminal charges against their daughter, which charges were immediately dropped after the 
Millers' testimony. Randall also gave false testimony. He claimed that on the night of the 
murder he was playing basketball at a local court until midnight, and that he was alone in 
his car. The court closed at 5 p.m., and Randall was cheating on his wife with a woman 
named Debbie, who was with him in his car. See Gershman, supra note 43, at 290-94. 
99 Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky has written a groundbreaking study on the cooperation 
process. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 31. Her Article is based on interviews with twenty- 
five former assistant United States Attorneys in the Southern District of New York, 
including most of the chiefs and deputy chiefs of the criminal division from 1990 to 1999, 
and sixteen other defense attorneys who had experiences with the cooperation process. 
Professor Yaroshefsky's study contains many valuable insights into the cooperation 
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The prosecutor's pretrial coaching of cooperating witnesses is 
vulnerable to many of the potential abuses noted above. The 
cooperating witness is (1) easily manipulated by coercive and 
suggestive interviewing techniques; (2) readily capable of giving 
false and embellished testimony with the prosecutor's knowledge, 
acquiescence, indifference, or ignorance; (3) readily capable of 
creating false impressions by omissions or memory alterations that 
in the absence of any recordation or documentation eludes 
disclosure and impeachment; and (4) able to present his testimony 
to the jury in a truthful and convincing manner, which because of 
the nature of the cooperation process is difficult to impeach 
through cross-examination.I0O 
A prosecutor has a powerful incentive to accept a 
cooperator's account uncritically.lOl Many prosecutors, if they are 
candid, will admit that in some cases they really do not know 
whether the cooperator is being truthful or dishonest. This is 
particularly the case when a prosecutor lacks evidence to 
corroborate the cooperator's account. Moreover, some 
prosecutors have a predetermined view of the facts of a case that 
constrains their ability or willingness to assess the cooperator's 
credibility objectively. They may have a theory of the case that 
they developed from other evidence or from reliance on the 
opinion of the case agent. These prosecutors believe that theory 
to be true, and to the extent that the cooperator's version is 
inconsistent with this theory, the prosecutor may conclude that the 
cooperator is lying or withholding information. 
Cooperators are manipulative, and some prosecutors can be 
easily manipulated. Some prosecutors trust their cooperators too 
process and the use of cooperation agreements. Her discussion raises difficult and 
troubling questions about how prosecutors obtain testimony from cooperators, the extent 
to which prosecutors and their agents actively shape and polish up this testimony, and the 
extent to which prosecutors knowingly rely on false and embellished testimony from 
cooperators. Given that her Article finds serious defects in the cooperation process in one 
of the most distinguished prosecutors' offices in the country, its conclusion suggests that 
the problem may be far more acute in federal and state prosecutors offices with a lesser 
commitment to truth and justice. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce Green, The Uniqueness 
of Federal Prosec~ltors, 88 CEO. L.J. 207,238 (2000) ("[Ilt may be that federal prosecutors, 
and the offices in which they work, take the duty [to do justice] more seriously than state 
prosecutors as a whole."). 
The setting for the proffer session is hardly conducive to producing a neutral, 
objective, and accurate recollection. The setting is often tense and intimidating. Given 
the enormous inducements to the cooperator to give false or misleading testimony, as well 
as the inducements to the prosecutor to accept the cooperator's veracity, the context is 
inherently manipulative for both the cooperator and the prosecutor. 
lo' A prosecutor should evaluate a cooperator's story objectively, even skeptically. A 
prosecutor who lacks sufficient objectivity may fail to notice serious gaps in a cooperator's 
story, and may more readily accept an illogical or improbable account. See Gershman, 
supra note 90, at 342-47. 
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much--one former prosecutor described the relationship as 
"falling in love with your ratv-and this mindset skews the 
prosecutor's ability to evaluate the cooperator's credibility 
objectively. These prosecutors may neglect to probe the 
cooperator's story or background intensively to uncover 
inconsistencies or outright lies. A recent illustration is United 
States v. W ~ l l a c h , ~ ~ ~  in which a key cooperating witness, Anthony 
Guariglia, gave perjured testimony about his gambling habits that 
the prosecutors could easily have checked but did not.Io3 
Moreover, some prosecutors have a cramped view of their 
ethical duty as ministers of justice. They believe that serving 
justice means getting convictions and putting bad people in jail.lW 
This mindset may be particularly noticeable with younger 
prosecutors, whose experience is confined to administering the 
federal sentencing guidelines. These prosecutors have been 
described as "Guidelines babies."lo5 They often exhibit a 
"mechanistic" and "hardened" view of justice.Io6 They perceive 
themselves as cops, and exude a "macho" persona wherein "[tlhey 
don't ask what's the right thing to do. They just want the right 
result."107 
Cooperators appreciate that their value depends on giving the 
prosecutor "what they want to hear."los This message is "drummed 
into defendants at the MCC (Metropolitan Correction Center) 
that you have got to have good information for the go~ernment."'~~ 
Many professional participants in federal criminal practice believe 
that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, particularly by their ability 
to confer unprecedented and enormous rewards on cooperators 
who provide law enforcement with "substantial assistance," create 
-- 
I" 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991). 
'03 Id. at 457 ("We fear that given the importance of Guariglia's testimony to the case, 
the prosecutors may have consciously avoided recognizing the obvious-that is, that 
Guariglia was not telling the truth."). 
IM See Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001) 
("Although the public has an interest in effective law enforcement, and although we 
expect law enforcement officers and prosecutors to be tough on crime and criminals, we 
do not expect them to be tough on the Constitution."). 
1" See Yaroshefsky, supra note 31, at 952. 
See id. at 949. 
lo7 Id. at 952. 
108 See Northern Mariana Islands, 243 F.3d at 1109: 
Never has it been more true than it is now that a criminal charged with a serious 
crime understands that a fast and easy way out of trouble with the law is not 
only to have the best lawyer money can buy or the court can appoint, but to cut 
a deal at someone else's expense and to purchase leniency from the government 
by offering testimony in return for immunity, or in return for reduced 
incarceration. 
Id. at 1123. 
109 Yaroshefsky, supra note 31, at 939. 
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a powerful incentive for cooperators to exaggerate and falsify 
information.'I0 
Moreover, some cooperators may not even appreciate the 
difference between truth and untruth. Cooperators frequently 
come from alien environments of crime and deceit that produce a 
mindset, according to some prosecutors, that "[tlruth equals what I 
know or what I can be caught at.""' Cooperators do not share the 
prosecutor's "obsession with exact facts."112 They use language in 
a loose, non-literal fashion that allows them to make false or 
exaggerated assertions that they might believe to be true. They 
might assume, for example, that if they have knowledge of certain 
information, it is immaterial how they came to learn it, whether 
through personal observation or based on what they may have 
heard.ll" 
I1O Cooperators typically enter into cooperation agreements with the government. The 
standard agreement provides that "[i]f the [United States Attorney's] Office determines 
that [the cooperator] has cooperated fully, provided substantial assistance to law 
enforcement authorities and otherwise complied with the terms of this agreement, the 
Office will file a motion with the sentencing court setting forth the nature and extent of 
[his] cooperation." Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69 n.108 
(1995). The agreement allows the cooperator to testify honestly that he does not know 
what punishment he will receive for his cooperation. See id. at 97 (finding that the 
government prefers uncertainty in its cooperation agreements to permit witness to testify 
that he does not know what benefits he will receive and that his benefits are contingent 
upon giving truthful testimony). Plea agreements that require as a condition of 
enforcement that the witness give testimony consistent with statements previously given to 
investigating officers have been struck down as violative of due process and the search for 
truth. See, e.g., State v. Fisher, 859 P.2d 179, 183 (Ariz. 1993); Sheriff, Humboldt County 
v. Acuna, 819 P.2d 197, 200 (Nev. 1991). Agreements that are contingent on the 
prosecution achieving a certain result are also inconsistent with public policy. See Yvette 
A. Berman, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea Agreements, 72 CORN ELL L. 
REV. 800,809-12 (1987). 
Cooperation agreements can be highly misleading. Their use has been criticized as 
"prosecutorial overkill" because they create a false impression that the prosecutor knows 
what the truth is, and is encouraging the cooperator to reveal the truth by offering 
leniency. See United States v. Arroyo-Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137, 1150 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(Friendly, J., concurring) ("[Cooperation agreements] inevitably give jurors the 
impression that the prosecutor is carefully monitoring the testimony of the cooperating 
witness to make sure that the latter is not stretching the facts--something the prosecutor 
usually is quite unable to do."). The cooperation agreement also misleads the jury by 
allowing a prosecutor to escape the insinuation that the cooperator's testimony is being 
purchased by instructing the cooperator to testify that any possible reward is contingent 
upon the cooperator telling the truth. 
Yaroshefsky, supra note 31, at 954. 
I t 2  Id. at 956. 
"3 See id. at 956-57. 
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Detecting coachmg is difficult for two reasons. First, there 
typically is no verbatim record or other significant documentation 
of the interview session. What occurs in this private encounter is 
known only to the prosecutor and witness. Second, cross- 
examination has a very limited capacity to expose improprieties in 
the preparation process. Preventing coaching typically rests on the 
integrity and sense of fairness of the individual prosecutor. 
Preparation of witnesses, when done properly, is an essential 
means of readying the prosecutor and witness for adversarial 
testing. By working closely with the witness, the prosecutor is able 
(1) to ascertain the truth fully, fairly, and objectively, (2) present 
the truth, as she honestly 'understands it, in an accurate, fair, and 
effective manner, and (3) protect the truth from being discredited 
and distorted by adversarial attack. These truth-serving goals, 
while applicable to all lawyers, would seem to be most clearly 
applicable to prosecutors who are unique among lawyers in their 
ethical obligation to seek justice rather than merely gain a partisan 
advantage.Il4 
However, for those prosecutors who do not view their role as 
ministers of justice, prophylactic procedures may be necessary to 
protect the fact-finding process from improper influences. These 
procedures might include: (1) a pretrial taint hearing to expose 
witness contamination; (2) expert testimony on memory and 
suggestive interviewing techniques; and (3) recording interview 
sessions for in camera judicial inspection. 
A. Documentation 
Witness preparation is done in private. Since there are no 
audio or video recordings of the interview process, there is 
virtually no way of learning precisely what transpired during the 
preparation session. Neither the. witness, the police, nor the 
prosecutor will readily acknowledge improper coaching. Nor is it 
the practice of prosecutors or police to prepare extensive written 
I l 4  See Gershman, supra note 90, at 314-15. The following discussion contains several 
references to the preparation of witnesses by private attorneys for non-criminal 
proceedings. However, to the extent that a prosecutor has an ethical duty to serve justice, 
which is not an obligation of a private attorney, these references should not be taken to 
suggest that a prosecutor enjoys similar latitude in the preparation process. Indeed, my 
thesis is that a prosecutor's discretion to prepare witnesses is much more circumscribed 
than that of the private practitioner. 
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or recorded evidence of the interview that might shed light on 
whether the witness was coached.I1To be sure, documentation of 
the preparation process, if available, might reveal overt attempts 
to shape the witness's testimony. However, documentation would 
not expose subtle cues that might produce false or misleading 
testimony that are attributable to a witness's own "suggestibility," 
"confabulation," and "memory hardening."Il6 
A prosecutor is legally required to disclose to the defense, for 
impeachment purposes, pretrial statements that a government 
witness made to the prosecutor, police, or other government 
agent."' However, the prosecutor is able to limit the availability of 
such statements by a variety of tactics. First, neither the police nor 
the prosecutor has any legal obligation to take notes.118 Some 
agents as a matter of policy do not take notes specifically to avoid 
creating contradicting evidence.lIy Some prosecutors do not 
The suggestion of coaching almost always rests on inferences based on the witness's 
actual testimony, in conjunction with any available evidence to demonstrate that the 
witness's account changed after being interviewed. See supra notes 24-30 and 
accompanying text. 
lIfi See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 59-60 (1987) (describing three general 
characteristics of hypnosis that produce inaccurate memories: suggestibility, where the 
witness tries to please the interviewer; confabulation, where the witness fills in details in 
order to make the answer more coherent and complete; and memory hardening, where the 
witness exhibits great confidence in both true and false memories). These same 
characteristics are present in witness preparation generally. See supra notes 44-83 and 
accompanying text. 
Discovery by the defense of prior statements of a witness is regulated by statute. See 
18 U.S.C. 9 3500(e) (1994) (the so-called "Jencks Act," which requires disclosure of 
statements by witness that (1) were signed or adopted by the witness, (2) contain a 
substantially verbatim recital of any oral statemcnt made by the witness and recorded 
contemporaneously with the making of such statement, or (3) contain any statement made 
by the witness to a grand jury); N.Y. PENAL LAW 9 240.45 (McKinney 1998) (requiring 
disclosure of any statement made by witness which relates to subject matter of witness's 
testimony). Due process also requires disclosure of witness statements which relate to the 
witness's testimony and are materially favorable to the defendant either to impeach the 
witness or exculpate the defendant. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). The 
Supreme Court has not decided whether the constitutional disclosure requirement 
embraces materially favorable information in the prosecutor's possession which might be 
denominated as "work product." See Williamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d 1177,1182 (11th Cir. 
2000) (suggesting that "extraordinary circumstances" might require disclosure of 
prosecutor's work product). 
"8 See United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854,859-60 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[Wle can find no 
statutory basis for compelling the creation of Jencks Act material . . . . Nor can we find a 
constitutional basis for compelling the creation of such material under Brady."). Once 
notes are made, however, they may not be destroyed. See United States v. Houlihan, 937 
F. Supp. 65,68-69 (D. Mass. 1996) (although "there is no affirmative obligation on the part 
of the government to take notes. . . the law is clear that the government may not destroy 
notes already made. . . ."). 
See Bernard, 625 F.2d at 859 (as one agent testified: "[Iln trying to avoid 
contradicting facts from the interview of any defendant or any informant, it is my policy 
not to write down anything until I am sure the defendant or informant knows exactly what 
he is saying."). 
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encourage note-taking, and occasionally even forbid government 
agents from taking notes.Iz0 According to one former prosecutor, 
"[t]hereYs a certain unconscious arrogation of power about it 
Another former prosecutor stated: "[Tlhe office lore is don't take 
too many notes or figure out how to take notes so that they are 
meaningful to you and no one else. You don't want a complete set 
of materials that you have to disclose."lZ2 Prosecutors and their 
agents typically do not prepare extensive notes, and when they do 
take notes, they try to do it in a safe way that avoids discl~sure. '~~ 
Thus, notes of significant comments, contradictions, and 
inconsistencies by a government witness are exempt from 
disclosure unless the notes are "a substantially verbatim recital of 
an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the 
government and recorded contemporaneously with their making 
of such oral statement."124 These notes may be withheld from the 
defense even if they contain significant impeachment evidence 
when it is shown that the notes are selections, summaries, or 
interpretations by the government agent.125 
Also, it is not uncommon for a government witness to be 
interviewed by a prosecutor after the witness has been intensively 
debriefed by the police. If the police do not take notes, or if they 
do not disclose their notes to the prosecutor, the prosecutor may 
never know what the witness initially told the police, whether the 
witness's initial account changed, or the extent to which the story 
was shaped or polished by police during the initial interview 
session. If the police employed the kinds of suggestive or coercive 
techniques described above, and absent any available record to 
document such conduct, it is unlikely that a prosecutor's 
- - - - - - ---- 
la See Yaroshefsky, supra note 31, at 962. 
I21 Id. 
Id. at 961. 
See id. at 961-62. 
124 18 U.S.C. 9 3500(e)(2) (1994). In Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349-50 
(1959), the Supreme Court found that Congress manifested an intention to restrict the use 
of such statements to eliminate the danger of distortion and misrepresentation inherent in 
a report which merely selects portions of a lengthy oral recital. According to the Court, it 
would be "grossly unfair to allow the defense to use statements to impeach a witness 
which could not fairly be said to be the witness' own rather than the product of the 
investigator's selections, interpretations, and interpolations." Id. at 350. 
'25 See id. See also Williamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(prosecutor's non-verbatim, non-adopted notes of witness statements not admissible at 
trial as impeachment evidence and therefore not Jencks material); United States v. Sasso, 
59 F.3d 341, 351 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that a prosecutor is not required to divulge 
even verbatim statements by a witness if the writer merely selected portions, albeit 
accurately, from lengthy oral statement); United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097, 1105 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (finding that although notes occasionally contained precise phrases used by 
witness, such brief quotations do not qualify the notes as Jencks material). 
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subsequent probing could effectively recreate the circumstances to 
demonstrate any improper influence on the witness's subsequent 
testimony. Moreover, as noted above, the witness herself may be 
unaware of the subtle techniques that may have influenced her 
testimony.Iz6 
B. Cross- Examination 
Cross-examination is assumed to be the most important 
adversarial safeguard to discovering the truth.lz7 However, there is 
no empirical basis for this assumption.128 In Ceders v. United 
States,Iz9 the Supreme Court observed that skillful cross- 
examination is a vital safeguard to uncovering improper 
preparation and coaching of witnesses. The Court assumed that 
the line between ethical pretrial preparation and unethical 
coaching is easily defined,I3O and that interrogation of the witness 
by opposing counsel could disclose improper influences. However, 
given the subtle ways that a witness's testimony can be 
manipulated, it is highly unlikely that cross-examination will 
disclose ~0aching.l~~ 
First, one of the cardinal precepts of cross-examination is to 
avoid asking questions of which the examiner does not know the 
answer.'32 Thus, lacking a factual basis to believe that a witness's 
memory has been manipulated, that an "I don't remember" is false 
or misleading, or that a failure to mention an incriminating fact is 
the product of improper coaching, it is unlikely that a cross- 
examiner would focus on the discrepancy, or be able to prepare an 
effective impeaching strategy about something of which he is 
126 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
127 See 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 5 1367, at 32 (J. Chadbourne rev. ed. 
1974) (describing cross-examination as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of truth"). Of course, cross-examination can also obscure the truth. See 
DamaSka, supra note 48, at 1094 ("Even with the best of intentions on the cross- 
examiner's part, reliable testimony may easily be made to look debatable, and clear 
information may become obfuscated."). 
I B  See Applegate, supra note 1, at 311 ("While the adversary system touts the 
effectiveness of cross-examination for revealing the truth, there is little empirical support 
for this conclusion."). 
Iz9 425 U.S. 80 (1976). 
Id. at 89,90 n.3. 
I3l See Zacharias & Martin, supra note 13, at 1010-11 (asserting that a "lawyer may so 
change a witness's presentation that the resulting testimony is either false or conveys an 
incorrect impression about the facts that cross-examination cannot counteract," but 
authors do not explain how cross-examination is frustrated). 
'32 This principle is one of Professor Younger's "Ten Commandments of Cross- 
Examination." See IRVING YOUNGER, TRIALTECHNIQUES 51 (R. Oliphant ed. 1978). 
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ignorant.133 Moreover, even if a witness's testimony has been 
improperly influenced during the coaching session, the opposing 
counsel would have no basis to believe that the witness's clear and 
convincing testimony is the product of an altered memory. 
Indeed, as noted above, it may often be the case that the witness 
herself is unaware of any improper inf l~ence. '~~ 
Additionally, although it is commonly recognized that the 
testimony of a cooperating witness is inherently suspect, and that 
the process of preparing and coaching the cooperating witness can 
impair the integrity of the truth-finding process, cross-examination 
is made even more difficult when the cooperating witness has been 
carefully coached to testify that any benefit is speculative, 
uncertain, and contingent upon his giving truthful testimony in 
accordance with his cooperation agreement.'35 
C. Protocol for Witness Preparation 
There is nothing wrong with a prosecutor assisting a witness 
to give testimony truthfully and effectively. However, under their 
obligation to serve justice, prosecutors should be able to regulate 
their own conduct to insure that witnesses are not exposed to 
suggestive questioning that may create false or misleading 
testimony. Prosecutors should be trained and supervised in 
interviewing protocols, the vulnerabilities of certain witnesses, and 
the psychological literature relating to memory, language, and 
comm~nication.'~~ 
The following is a protocol for witness preparation by 
prosecutors. It is based largely on this writer's experience as a 
prosecutor. It differs in several important respects from advice 
contained in practitioner-oriented publications typically addressed 
133 For example, if a cross-examiner is unaware of, or does not believe that any deals or 
promises were made to the witness in exchange for his testimony, it is unlikely that an 
experienced cross-examiner would ask the witness about hypothetical deals or promises or 
whether the witness was coached to avoid mentioning the subject. See United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (suggesting that since the government failed to respond 
affirmatively to pretrial requests by the defense for disclosure of any monetary benefits to 
government witnesses, it is unlikely that defense counsel would ask the witnesses whether 
they received benefits since counsel would reasonably expect the answer to be "no."). 
134 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra note 1.10. 
136 For an excellent text used in law school courses on interviewing and counseling, see 
ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, A N D  
NEGOTIATING (1990). This book broadly instructs on interviewing skills, verbal and 
nonverbal communication techniques, probing skills, and psychological and psychosocial 
influences on communication. 
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to civil litigation attorneys.i37 In preparing a witness for testifying 
at trial, a prosecutor should: 
1. Demand Truth 
Advise the witness to tell only the truth as he knows it, not 
what he thinks he knows, or what someone else knows.'38 Advise 
the witness not to embellish facts, or fill in gaps of memory, and 
that if he does not remember something, to say 
2. Be Objective 
Evaluate the witness's story objectively to determine its 
accuracy and believability. Ask open-ended questions initially, 
and use more specific questions after the witness has given a 
complete account of the event.I4O Never put words in the witness's 
mouth or suggest answers.I4' Know as much as possible about the 
witness's background and any interest the witness might have to 
falsify, and probe these areas carefully without suggesting any 
desired response. 
See supra note 11 .  
Of course, no prosecutor ever really knows whether her witness is being truthful. It 
is important, however, to instruct the witness when necessary, and emphasize repeatedly, 
the importance of telling the truth. A prosecutor should explain to the witness that from a 
moral perspective, the oath that the witness takes requires truthful testimony, the witness 
may be convicted of perjury or obstruction of justice for giving untruthful testimony, and 
the exposure of the witness to cross-examination will render an attempt to conceal the 
truth difficult. 
The extent to which a defense attorney is allowed to present untruthful testimony of 
the defendant is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 
(1986) (finding that a defense lawyer did not provide ineffective assistance by refusing to 
cooperate in client's perjury). 
139 See Patricia J. Kerrigan, Witness Preparation, 1999 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1367, 1380 
("Let the witness know that a jury may find it more credible for a witness not to remember 
an incident from the past than to seem to have perfect recall of everything."). 
'40 See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 136, at 157; Wydick, supra note 5, at 42- 
43. 
I 4 l  The extent to which an attorney is permitted to orient a witness on the applicable 
law, or the attorney's theory of the case, prior to hearing the witness's initial recollection, 
is unclear. Compare Monroe H. Freedman, Counseling the Client: Refreshing Recollection 
or Prompting Perjury?, LITIG., Spring 1976 (suggesting that such conduct is unethical), 
with In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 502 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 
1980) ("[Ilt is fully appropriate for defense counsel to refresh the recollection of the 
witness as to the facts, familiarize him with the relevant documents, and cause him to 
understand fully the company's views and attitudes concerning the litigation."). 
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3. Outline Courtroom Procedures 
Explain courtroom procedures, where the witness will sit, and 
the order of q~esti0ning.l~~ Do not advise an identification witness 
where the defendant will be sitting.'" Advise the witness to speak 
in a loud, clear voice so the jurors can hear what is being said, and 
to make eye contact with the jury when appr~priate . '~~ Advise the 
witness to sit straight, avoid distracting body language, and dress 
appr0priate1y.l~~ 
4. Rehearse Direct Examination 
Write out direct examination questions ahead of time and 
rehearse specific questions with the witness.'" The witness should 
be encouraged to use his own words whenever possible, and not to 
use slang or offensive expressions.14' Control the witness's answers 
to the extent of preventing the witness from giving long, rambling 
narratives, and ensure that the witness does not violate rules of 
'42 See CARSLON & IMWINKELRIED,  supra note 11, at 183 (suggesting that a lawyer 
show the witness the courtroom, observe some testimony, and if the courtroom is vacant 
put the witness on the stand to get a "perspective" and "feel" of the witness stand); 
Flowers, supra note 2, at 745 (explaining that it is appropriate to describe the courtroom 
and where everyone will be seated, and to take the witness to the courtroom to observe 
the layout); Altman, supra note 33, at 42 (stating that it is appropriate to instruct a witness 
on the basic rules of effective testimony). 
143 See United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 745 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that it is 
improper for a prosecutor to advise an identification witness as to where defendant will be 
seated). 
144 See DAVID BALL, THEATER TIPS AND STRATEGIES FOR J U R Y  TRIALS 28-30 (1994) 
(describing general behavioral suggestions for witnesses); JAMES W. MCELHANEY, TRIAL 
NOTEBOOK 51-54 (3d ed. 1994) (same). 
14s It is generally appropriate for lawyers to advise witnesses about how to dress and 
give suggestions on demeanor. See CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11, at 183 
(noting that some attorneys routinely videotape practice sessions and review them with 
witnesses to avoid negative mannerisms and promote a positive, confident demeanor); 
THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 475 (4th ed. 1996); BALL, supra note 144, at 
323; MCELHANEY, sl~pra note 144, at 51; J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL 
PROCESS: LAW, TAC~ICS AND ETHICS 262 (1993). The extent to which the prohibition of 
falsification of testimony includes an attempt by an attorney to alter a witness's demeanor 
is unclear. See Piorkowski, supra note 13, at 404-05 (describing an attempt by a prosecutor 
to encourage the identification witness to appear confident as misconduct when the 
witness is only 51 percent certain that defendant was the perpetrator). 
146 See CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED,  supra note 11, at 182 (recommending that 
attorney conduct a practice session consisting of mock direct and cross-examination). 
See Altman, supra note 33, at 43 (citing Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912,913-14, n.3) 
("[Tlhere is nothing unethical about an attorney making suggestions about the witness's 
wording as long as those suggestions do not encourage what the attorney knows or 
reasonably believes is false or misleading testimony."). 
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evidence. If tangible evidence is being introduced, show the 
evidence to the witness and go through the process of laying the 
foundation. Have the witness do whatever demonstration he will 
be asked to do in the courtroom. 
5. Reconcile Inconsistencies 
Cautiously try to reconcile the witness's testimony with other 
evidence. This may include prodding the witness's recollection 
with prior statements that the witness made, or referring to other 
facts in the case, including the testimony of other witnesses.14s 
Never suggest what a witness should say, or telegraph what the 
witness should say, by revealing inconsistencies or weaknesses in 
the witness's te~tim0ny.I~~ Review the witness's prior testimony 
with the witness, but do not allow the witness to read any prior 
testimony unless absolutely necessary.150 
6. Prepare Cross-Examination 
Prepare for cross-examination by going through all 
discrepancies in the witness's prior testimony or other 
statements.I5l Try to ensure that the witness can correct or explain 
Courts and commentators suggest that there is nothing inherently wrong with 
attempting, even aggressively, to change a witness's initial version of the facts when the 
attorney believes that the version is inaccurate or incomplete. See Resolution Trust Corp. 
v. Bright, 6 F.3d 336,341 (5th Cir. 1993). It is one thing to ask a witness to swear to facts 
which are knowingly false. It is another thing, in an arms-length interview with a witness, 
for an attorney to attempt to persuade her, even aggressively, that her initial version of a 
certain fact situation is not complete or accurate. Altman, supra note 33, at 41 (arguing 
that it is appropriate for an attorney to aggressively question a witness "to challenge the 
witness's initial recollection to persuade the witness that it is untrue and, therefore, should 
be changed"). But see Applegate, supra note 1, at 328 ("[A] major incentive for trial 
preparation is to obtain support for an uncertain version of the facts and not to confirm a 
version of the facts that appears to represent the whole truth."). 
149 See Miller, supra note 46, at 12 ("Where questions are asked, how they are prefaced, 
suggestions in the wording, and the content of follow-up questions may do more to 
determine what is retrieved than anything that occurred previously.") But see Altman, 
supra note 33, at 42 (arguing that it is appropriate to "challenge" a witness's interpretation 
of facts and this "offers the witness the opportunity to modify her characterization to 
make it more truthful"). 
15O But see Kerrigan, supra note 139, at 1379 ("Have the witness review any prior 
depositions they have given, discovery responses they have signed, or prior statements 
they have given, and consider having the witness review other relevant testimony and 
discovery responses."). 
151 See CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11, at 182-83 (recommending that 
another attorney conduct the cross because "if you conduct cross and the cross is too 
'effective,' the experience may impair your working relationship with the witness"). 
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each discrepancy. Go through a witness's criminal background 
and any interest the witness may have in testifying. Make sure that 
the witness acknowledges prior convictions and bad acts. A 
witness should be encouraged not to volunteer information, to 
limit answers as much as possible to "yes" or "no," not to guess or 
embellish an answer, to make an effort to remember, and not to be 
afraid to acknowledge a mistake.152 The witness should be told not 
to look at the prosecutor during cross-examination, not to answer 
a question when the prosecutor stands up to object, and to answer 
in a positive tone if he is asked whether he spoke to the police or 
prosecutor about the case. A prosecutor should do a mock cross- 
examination with the witness to anticipate what defense counsel 
will likely ask.153 
D. Remedies 
1. Pretrial Taint Hearing 
A pretrial "taint" hearing should be required when there is 
some basis to believe that a witness's testimony has been 
improperly influenced by suggestive or coercive interviewing 
techniques. Such a hearing is not unusual. It has been authorized 
in many instances in whlch police or prosecutorial conduct has 
placed the integrity of the fact-finding process into question and 
there is a need for the procedural protection of a pretrial hearing 
to exclude from a potential prosecution the prejudicial effects of 
tainted evidence. Thus, pretrial hearings have been employed to 
determine the admissibility of in-court identification testimony 
because of pretrial suggestivene~s,~~~ statements of children in 
sexual abuse cases,Is5 hypnotically-recalled in-court testimony,lS6 
152 See Altman, supra note 33, at 43 (explaining that it is proper to instruct the witness 
to testify to lack of memory if the witness honestly does not remember). However, the 
witness should be advised that an "I don't remember" may be perjurious. See United 
States v. Barnhart, 889 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1989). In addition, an attorney may be 
suborning perjury if he counsels or suggests that a witness can safely profess ignorance 
even if the witness can remember the event. See, e.g., Sheriff v. Hecht, 710 P.2d 728 (Nev. 
1985). Moreover, instructing a witness to answer only the question asked and not 
volunteer answers may be unethical if the strategy is designed to conceal relevant 
information. See, e.g., United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1.443 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(attorney instructs witness to avoid volunteering anything,about a relevant conversation 
by answering the cross-examiner's question "[Wlhat happened next?" with anything that 
happened next other than the conversation). 
153 See Altman, supra note 33, at 42 ("Rehearsing a witness's testimony is a well- 
established professional practice."). 
Is4 See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
IS5 See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994). 
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breathalyzer evidence because of prior falsified police breathalyzer 
reports,ls7 and evidence following police investigatory 
misconduct .Isx 
A pretrial taint hearing into the reliability of a witness's 
testimony based on pretrial suggestiveness should consider all 
relevant circumstances, including any inconsistency between a 
witness's statements, the interest or motivation of a witness to 
falsify, the presence or absence of corroboration, the nature of the 
corroboration, the inherent believability of the statements, the 
existence of any documentation of the debriefing and preparation 
sessions, the rewards and other inducements to testify, the scope of 
punishment to which a cooperating witness may be exposed in the 
absence of cooperation, the manner and form of the questioning, 
the number of interview sessions, and the person or persons 
present when the statements were made. 
Defense counsel, in order to obtain a pretrial hearing, would 
have the burden initially of making some factual showing that a 
witness has been subjected to improper conduct by the prosecution 
that has caused the witness to adjust his testimony. In making its 
determination, a court should consider whether, under all the 
circumstances, the interview and preparation sessions give rise to a 
substantial likelihood of false, inaccurate, or misleading testimony. 
2. Expert Testimony 
Given the capacity of the witness-preparation process to 
produce false or distorted testimony, courts should allow experts 
in cognitive psychology to testify how memory, language, and 
communication can produce false, inaccurate, or misleading 
testimony.Is' Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes 
15h See People v. Hughes, 453 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 1983). 
15' See State v. Gookins, 637 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 1994). 
IsR See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1 977). 
lSy Experts have been allowed to testify to psychological factors affecting the reliability 
of a witness's identification. See generally United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 
1991); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Nonvood, 
939 F. Supp 1132 (D.N.J. 1996); Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1991); People v. 
McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984); State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983). For 
example, experts have testified regarding a defendant's susceptibility to government 
inducements to prove entrapment by showing lack of predisposition. See United States v. 
Newman, 849 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 
1984); United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981). Experts have also testified about 
the risk of false memory implantation on young children from improper interviewing 
techniques. See State v. Sargent, 738 A.2d 351 (N.H. 1999). Finally, experts have testified 
on the reliability of a defendant's confession from coercive police interviewing techniques. 
See United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. 111.1997). 
Heinonline - -  23 Cardozo L. Rev. 860 2001-2002 
20021 WITNESS COACHING BY PROSECUTORS 86 1 
the use of scientific testimony by an expert to assist the jury in 
understanding the extent to which suggestive influences in the 
debriefing and coaching of witnesses may produce false or 
inaccurate testimony.160 AS now occurs with eyewitness 
te~tirnony,'~~ the expert could identify the factors that influence 
perception and memory, the extent to which witnesses are 
susceptible to suggestive influences, and how pretrial interviewing 
techniques are likely to produce false, inaccurate, or embellished 
te~tirn0ny.l~~ Contrary to the belief of many jurors, an expert could 
testify that there is no necessary correlation between a witness's 
confidence and the accuracy of her te~tim0ny.l~~ Experts could 
also counter a belief held by some jurors that witnesses have a 
better memory for dramatic events.16" 
3. Recording 
To enable the defendant to challenge the veracity of the 
witness effectively, and a jury to assess his credibility, all 
interviews with potential trial witnesses should be electronically 
recorded either by audio or videotaping. Videotaping would be 
preferable to sound recording as it would depict the physical 
interaction and body language of the participants. The use of such 
a procedural safeguard is unusual, but hardly novel. Videotaping 
of interview sessions with child witnesses is not 
Moreover, videotaping has been used when it is important to 
document whether the government used unfair tactics to produce 
evidence, such as a defendant's confession,166 or for interrogations 
conducted before and after hypnosis.I6' 
160 Rule 702 states: " I f  scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier o f  fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified 
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form o f  an opinion or otherwise." FED.  R. EVID.  702. 
I6l See supra note 159. 
162 See supra notes 44-83 and accompanying text. 
163 See Miller, supra note 46, at 1.5-16. 
16" See id. 
165 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
166 TWO states, Minnesota and Alaska, require that police interrogations o f  suspects be 
recorded on tape. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587,589 (Minn. 1994) ("In the exercise 
o f  our supervisory powers we mandate a recording requirement for all custodial 
interrogations."); Stephan v. State, 711. P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) ("Today, we hold 
that an unexcused failure to electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a 
place o f  detention violates a suspect's right to due process, under the Alaska Constitution, 
and that any statement thus obtained is generally inadmissible."). 
167 See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 60 (1987) ("Tape or video recording o f  all 
interr3gations, before, during, and after hypnosis, can help reveal i f  leading questions were 
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Recording the interview session is essential to disclose the 
presence or extent of the different types of suggestive influences 
discussed above. Taping would reveal overt attempts to influence 
the witness's testimony by use of leading questions or other cues 
that alert the witness to the expected answer. Whereas recording 
of the sessions would not necessarily reveal whether a witness's 
story was a fabrication from the start, it might demonstrate 
whether the witness embellished his story to please the 
government or filled in details to make the story more complete or 
persuasive, and the extent to which his story crystallized and 
became more confident over several interview sessions. 
It may be that courts should have the authority to conduct an 
in camera inspection of the recording, and preclude the use of any 
portions that contain embarrassing or sensitive material. To be 
sure, a prosecutor could properly seek to preclude from disclosure 
statements by a cooperating witness that might compromise an 
ongoing investigation. A court also could limit the use of the 
recorded interview session to those portions that reveal that a 
witness is trying to please the interviewer, confabulating the story 
by appearing to fill in details to make the story more coherent and 
complete, or demonstrating memory "hardening" by appearing to 
suddenly and confidently remember new details. 
The preparation of witnesses for testimony at trial is a 
necessary and acceptable part of the prosecutor's function. 
However, some prosecutors engage in conduct that goes beyond 
permissible trial preparation. These prosecutors either overtly, 
covertly or even inadvertently, cause witnesses to give testimony 
that is false, inaccurate, or misleading. And given that witness- 
coaching is done in private, there is usually no evidence of 
improper conduct. Therefore, the ability of cross-examination to 
reveal such improper conduct is extremely limited. 
Coaching typically is accomplished through memory 
reconstruction, suggestions that improve testimony, and cues that 
alter testimonial language. Some witnesses such as children, 
identification witnesses, and cooperating witnesses are highly 
susceptible to coaching. These witnesses are capable of adjusting 
their testimony based on leading, suggestive, coercive or 
intimidating questions or statements. Furthermore, the prestige 
asked."). 
Heinonline - -  23 Cardozo L. Rev. 862 2001-2002 
20021 WITNESS  COACHING BY PROSECUTORS 863 
and power of the prosecutor enhances her ability to influence the 
witness's testimony improperly. 
Given the potential of witness coaching to skew the fact- 
finding process, this Article offers several suggestions to expose 
improper influences and prevent false or inaccurate testimony. 
These include a pretrial taint hearing when there is some basis to 
believe that a witness has been improperly influenced, expert 
testimony to assist the jury in understanding the vulnerability of 
memory and the dangers to accurate testimony from certain types 
of interviewing techniques, and electronically recording witness- 
preparation sessions. Any or all of these recommendations, if 
adopted, would protect the fact-finding from overzealous conduct. 
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